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Abstract 
We develop a novel Russian-language electronic content analysis dictionary and method to 
analyse Russian state media’s framing of the Euromaidan protests. We find that around the 
time of Crimea’s annexation, the Kremlin-controlled media projected media narratives of 
protests as chaos and disorder along with legalistic jargon about the status of ethnic Russians 
and federalisation, only to abandon this strategy by the end of April 2014. The shift in media 
narratives corresponding to the outbreak of Donbas violence gives credence to arguments 
about Putin’s tactical and interests-driven foreign policy, while nuancing those that highlight 
the role of norms and values.  
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Introduction 
It is well known that Russia deployed modern media technologies as a foreign policy tool in the wake of 
Ukraine’s Euromaidan, annexation of Crimea and war in the Donbas (Cottiero, Kucharski et al. 2015; 
Darczewska 2014; Dubovyk 2015; Dunn and Bobick 2014; Dyczok 2015; Galeotti 2015, 2015; Gaufman 2015; 
Hutchings and Szostek 2015; Hutchings and Tolz 2015; Leshchenko 2014; Oates 2013; Pomerantsev 2015; 
Schimpfossl and Yablokov 2014). Yet, systematic scholarship on Russia’s precise media manipulative tactics 
has remained scarce. A handful of studies have rigorously analysed the narratives deployed in the Kremlin-
controlled media in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis (Cottiero, Kucharski et al. 2015; Hutchings and Szostek 
2015; Hutchings and Tolz 2015; Nelson, Orttung et al. 2015). Yet, few other observers have gone beyond 
restating Russia’s well-known shock tactics of broadcasting fabricated allegations on state TV like the alleged 
crucifixion of an ethnically Russian boy; or the image of a heavily pregnant Russian woman, ostensibly 
murdered by Ukrainian nationalists in the Donbas. Such observations present us with a rather static view of 
Russia’s media tactics, and reveal little about the nuances of shifts in these tactics as the conflict unfolded. 
 To redress these omissions in scholarship, we develop a novel electronic content analysis method and 
dictionary for exploring media framing of protests. The content analysis method that we develop in this paper is 
called Latent Semantic Scaling (LSS) (Author 2015). This technique facilitates the analysis of semantic nuances 
of how a particular subject—in our case it is protests—is covered in the media. Applying the LSS technique, we 
constructed a Russian-language dictionary of words frequently appearing in stories about protests. The 
dictionary construction process involved assigning scores along a disorder-freedom to protest scale to lines of 
text in randomly-selected batches of news stories on protest. This part of the analysis was performed by coders 
with native Russian language fluency. The computer program that we developed then ‘learned’ what scores to 
assign to text on protest based on the human component of coding. Because this process involved both human 
coding and electronic analysis, it is known as ‘supervised machine learning’. The dictionary could be applied to 
perform electronic content analysis of large volumes of news stories so as to explore over-time shifts in the 
media framing of protest.  
 We employ this technique to analyse the framing of Ukraine’s protests in Russian state-controlled 
media. We also perform simple word frequency analysis to explore how the rhetoric about the rights of Russian 
speakers in Ukraine changed as the conflict unfolded. Nearly 10,000 media stories from both Russia’s leading 
state controlled, and Russian and Ukrainian non-state-controlled, media sources covering the period 1 
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November 2013 to 31 December 2014, are analysed. We find that around the time of Crimea’s annexation, the 
Kremlin-controlled media projected narratives of protests as chaos and disorder, with legalistic jargon about the 
status of ethnic Russians and federalisation, only to abandon this tactic by the end of April 2014. This shift in 
media narratives corresponds to the evolving situation on the ground, notably the outbreak of Donbas violence. 
As such, it lends credence to arguments about Putin’s tactical and pragmatic foreign policy, while nuancing 
those that highlight the role of norms and values, such as those related to genuine concern about Russian 
speakers or advancement of Russian nationalist ideology.  
 Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief background discussion of the 
events covered in our study. We then outline our analytical framework. Next, we discuss our methodology and 
data and present results of electronic content analysis. We then situate our findings in the debates about Russia’s 
foreign policy objectives in Ukraine and highlight how our analysis can contribute to these debates. The final 
section concludes with a discussion of the scope and limitations of our study, while also highlighting its 
potential for contributing to wider theorizing into the role of the media in authoritarian regimes’ foreign policies.  
 
Background and Timeline: The Euromaidan and Russia’s Intervention 
Our analytical and methodological strategy consists of exploring the semantic shifts in Russian media’s 
coverage of protest during the first pivotal months of the Ukrainian crisis. We therefore begin by providing a 
brief outline of these events. 
 The initial trigger to Russia’s involvement in Ukraine had been alleged Western meddling in seeking to 
keep Ukraine on the Europeanisation track. President Viktor Yanukovych made a last-minute announcement on 
21 November 2013 that he would not sign the European Union (EU) Association Agreement at a ceremony in 
the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius on 28-29 November. The Association Agreement was part of the Eastern 
Partnership (EP) process. It had been conceived by Poland and Sweden and inaugurated officially in 2009 with 
the aims of intensifying the EU’s relationships with Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia. The Kremlin objected to aspects of the EP process that would arguably prejudice existing trade ties 
among post-Soviet states and bring Western institutions into what Russia considered to be its area of strategic 
interest and that it sought to tie into its web of alliances (Wilson 2014). 
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 The Euromaidan started as a peaceful protest on the evening of 21 November 2013 in Kiev and was 
followed by protests in Ukraine’s other major cities.1 The protests were accompanied by attempts at disruption 
and violent provocations by the so-called titushki (thugs). On November 30, the riot police force units, the 
Berkut, sought to disperse the protests, sparking violence and rioting involving the police and protesters, notably 
on December 1 when protesters reoccupied the Maidan. On 16 January 2014, the government passed laws 
restricting freedom of assembly. This sparked further protests and was followed by violence and death of 100 
protesters. Both the pro- and anti-Euromaidan forces blamed provocations by the opposite side on the killing of 
innocent civilians on 18-23 February. On 21 February, EU leaders helped broker a political agreement between 
the government and the parliamentary opposition forces and activists. The agreement included provisions for 
return to a presidential-parliamentary government and early presidential elections to be held before the end of 
the year. On 22 February however Yanukovych fled the country. One week later, on 27 February masked men in 
unmarked uniforms stormed into the parliament of the Crimean region, taking over strategic buildings and other 
infrastructure across the Crimean peninsula. On 11 March, the Crimean legislature and city council of the City 
of Sevastopol declared support for Crimea’s independence from Ukraine in the event of a ‘yes’ vote in a 
referendum on Crimea’s secession. On 16 March, Russia staged a referendum on the incorporation into Russia 
in Ukraine’s Crimea region. On 18 March, the Republic of Crimea, including the City of Sevastopol, signed an 
accession treaty with Russia, and Crimea and Sevastopol joined Russia as two of its federal subjects. Parallel to 
these events, beginning in the start of March, pro-Russian and anti-Maidan protests took place in the Luhansk 
and Donetsk oblasts in the southeast of Ukraine, which rapidly escalated into armed military conflict between 
the rebel groups and Ukrainian military and paramilitary forces. By many accounts, until at least August 2014, 
when the leadership of the break-away regions changed, Russian armed and security and paramilitary forces had 
been involved in the conflict (Miller et al. 2015; Minasyan 2015).  
 On 11 May, a number of towns under the control of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk 
republics held referenda on their status, but Russia did not officially recognise or sanction the referenda. In fact, 
on 7 May Russia’s President Vladimir Putin publicly urged the rebels to postpone the holding of the referenda. 
Other evidence also emerged that the Kremlin was losing control of the rebel groups when an agreement 
between Russia, Ukraine and Western leaders (US and EU) to deescalate the conflict—the Geneva Statement on 
                                                 
1 The key dates and events for this timeline are taken from Wikipidia.  Available at: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donbass_status_referendums,_2014, accessed 6 July 2016. 
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Ukraine issued on 17 April—prompted a response by the paramilitaries that the Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov did not represent them. A widely-cited and publicised poll carried out on 8-16 April in Donetsk 
by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology revealed that only 27.5% of the population supported seceding 
from Ukraine and joining Russia; 41.1% supported greater decentralisation and autonomy from Kiev, while 
supporting the option of Ukraine remaining a unitary state; 38.4% supported turning Ukraine into a federal state; 
and 10.6% supported the institutional status quo. The referenda in the Crimea and the Donbas cities and towns 
were widely regarded as illegitimate. The results indicating overwhelming support for secession (96.7% in 
Crimea) (Wilson 2014) could not be verified by independent observers. Yet, by many accounts, a sizeable share 
of Crimea’s population, perhaps at least 40% (Wilson 2014)—if not in such overwhelming numbers as indicated 
by the disputed referendum—supported secession, while surveys (such as those cited above) and other expert 
accounts would not support this assertion for the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (Wilson 2014). The Malaysian 
Airlines Flight MH17 tragedy occurred on 17 July 2014. On that day, the plane going from Amsterdam to Kuala 
Lumpur flew over the conflict zone in Eastern Ukraine and was shot down, with all passengers on board killed. 
 The US announced the first round of sanctions on 6 March 2014. On 17 March, the US, EU and 
Canada introduced targeted sanctions. On 28 April 2014, a second round of sanctions by the US was imposed, 
this time directly affecting the business activities in the US of Igor Sechin, Chairman of Russia’s state oil 
company Rosneft, and those of a number of other companies. The EU also imposed further sanctions, 
specifically imposing travel bans on individuals implicated in support for the annexation of Crimea. In July, 
August, September, October and December 2014, additional sanctions were imposed by the EU, US and several 
other states.  
 In this paper, we consider Russia’s reaction to the Euromaidan in the context of the earlier Colour 
Revolutions that have challenged unpopular leaders. This happened in Ukraine in 2004, but also in Georgia, 
Serbia and Kyrgyzstan. In fact, as Andrew Wilson (2014, p. 66) reminds us, even before Yanukovych’s ‘volte 
face’ on Vilnius, Ukrainian activists had been planning to stage demonstrations on November 22 to mark the 
ninth anniversary of the original 2004 Maidan and to register their frustration with Yanukovych. Two years 
before the Euromaidan, in the Winter months of 2011-2012, Russia also witnessed a mass uprising when 
thousands of protesters brandishing white ribbons—the symbol of the protest movement—took to the streets of 
Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities across Russia (Skovoroda and Lankina 2016). The protesters challenged 
electoral misconduct perpetrated in the December State Duma (Parliamentary) elections and registered their 
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anger at the prospect of Vladimir Putin being re-elected as President for a third time in the March 2012 
Presidential elections. Not only did the Kremlin resort to repression to prevent future protests, but it also 
deployed the state-controlled media to stigmatize anti-regime rallies (Authors 2016).  
 President Yanukovych’s flight from Kiev in February 2014 and much-publicized abandonment of his 
lavish residence would have further underscored for the Kremlin the power of mass street protests to topple 
unpopular rulers, and those who could be perceived as Russia’s regional allies, from power. Throughout the 
summer months, Euromaidan remained a constant backdrop to the conflict, with thousands of protesters 
demanding a voice in reforming Ukraine and in the country’s governance. 
 
Analytical framework 
Our concern in this paper is to explore how Russia’s state-controlled media covered the Euromaidan. We use the 
term ‘state-controlled’ to refer to TV and print sources and the online versions of these sources that are partially 
or fully owned by the state. We also explore coverage by sources that are not state-owned. Considering that 
editorial policy is likely to be influenced by the specific owners of media outlets, even if the media proprietor is 
not the state, we hesitate to use the term ‘independent’ with reference to such sources. We therefore describe 
them as ‘non-state-controlled’ or ‘not controlled by the state’. The empirical analysis section of the paper 
provides further detail on the ownership structure of the various sources. 
 To begin to make sense of how Russia’s state-controlled media covered the Euromaidan, and how 
media coverage shifted as the events unfolded, we deploy the concepts of agenda-setting and framing. These are 
established lenses for analysing media coverage of public issues. According to media scholarship, mass 
communications often perform an important agenda-setting function. In their widely-cited book, Shanto Iyengar 
and Donald Kinder highlight how viewers are often unaware of particular topics, or have not formed opinions 
on them, until these topics repeatedly appear in the narratives of TV presenters. ‘Those problems that receive 
prominent attention on the national news become the problems the viewing public regards as the nation’s most 
important’, they hypothesize (1987, p. 16). In what Iyengar and Kinder (1987, p. 33) refer to as an ‘agenda-
setting effect’, they find that television in particular can powerfully alter the public’s priorities by virtue of 
disproportionate coverage of a particular issue. As the media shift to focusing on another topic, so too is the 
perception of which public issues the audience ought to focus on and perceive as significant. In another classic 
body of work, Maxwell McCombs suggests that how both television and print media sources select particular 
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news to focus on, the volume of coverage, and where the news sources place specific stories in terms of 
sequence or location, can likewise powerfully affect what the public perceive to be ‘important topics of the day’. 
‘While the press may not tell us what to think, it is stunningly successful in telling us what to think about’, he 
writes (1977, p. 90) (emphasis original). 
The other concept of framing that we deploy in our analysis had been popularized by the sociologist 
Erving Goffman several decades ago and has been widely used since in social movement scholarship in 
particular (Goffman 1975). We here employ the definition of framing by Thomas Nelson et al. (1997, p. 567) as 
a ‘process by which a communication source such as a news organization, defines and constructs a political 
issue or public controversy’. ‘Frames serve as bridges between elite discourse about a problem or issue and 
popular comprehension of that issue’, write Nelson et al. in another article (1997b, p. 224). Frames can be thus 
regarded as cues for interpreting matters of public significance and for making judgements about appropriate 
remedies for particular problems. Frames can go beyond simply reinforcing existing opinions: they can in fact 
help alter public attitudes and preferences (Cottle 2008; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson and Meyer 
1996; Lindekilde 2014; McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996; Peng 2008; Snow and Benford 1992; Snow, E. Burke 
Rochford et al. 1986; Snow, Louis A. Zurcher et al. 1980; Zald 1992).  
When it comes to the nuances of framing specifically related to protest, following Nelson et al. (1997), 
and building upon our earlier frame analysis (Authors 2016) we distinguish between two broad shades of media 
framing of protest: protest as public disorder (the disorder frame); and, alternatively, protest as representing the 
right of citizens to public assembly (the freedom to protest frame). Of course, these contrasting frames could be 
regarded as extremes on a semantic scale whereby frames on one end stigmatize street protest, and, on the other 
end, portray it as legitimate or desirable in a democratic state. For example, in a story framed as freedom to 
protest, we might find positive references to protests as respectable and legitimate expressions of mass concern 
about important political issues. In a disorder story, we might see protesters as marginal figures, or we might be 
shown pictures of armed police in riot gear (Nelson, Clawson et al. 1997). In democracies too, the media often 
tend to default to a ‘status quo’ perspective (McLeod and Detenber 1999), subtly delegitimising street rallies 
(Deluca, Lawson et al. 2012; Smith, McCarthy et al. 2001). We would expect the media in authoritarian states to 
be especially prone to resorting to a disorder narrative of protests that challenge the domestic regime or its allies 
abroad.  
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In analysing the media’s role in the Euromaidan and the domestic and inter-state crisis that followed, 
much of the analytical inquiry has focused on the role of online social media use by citizens (Bohdanova 2014; 
Dickinson 2014; Goban-Klas 2014; Leshchenko 2014; Onuch 2015; Zaliznyak 2014). Some studies have 
touched upon both the agenda-setting and framing aspects of Russian media (Goble 2014; Hutchings and 
Szostek 2015; Potyatynyk and Potyatynyk 2014). Thus, Potyatynyk and Potyatynyk (2014) have shown how 
Russian media narratives drew on the Second World War symbolism and vocabulary to foment ethnically-based 
hostility towards Ukrainian-speakers and thereby justify Russia’s irredentism in Ukraine (see also Kuzio 2015; 
Suslov 2014; Teper 2015). Cottiero et al. (2015) also highlight how the narratives of ‘fascism’ and ‘Nazism’ 
were arguably effective in tapping into the repository of shared wartime national memories.  
 Our focus and methodological strategy are different here. Essentially, we explore the extent to which 
Russia replicated the semantic toolkit that the Kremlin used against its own protesters at home to stigmatize 
street action as inherently dangerous and destabilizing at various stages of the crisis. We also analyse the 
proposed remedies that featured in the media against the backdrop of rhetoric on violence and disorder. The 
changes in the nuances of protest framing and in the likelihood of particular agenda featuring in the media as the 
events unfolded are also explored. We know from a number of qualitative studies that following Crimea’s 
annexation, the Russian regime changed its tactics in Ukraine in response to intra-elite disagreements and loss of 
control over the Donbas rebels. For example, scholars have pointed to Russia’s dis-engagement from the agenda 
of ‘federalisation’ or Crimea-style separation of Ukraine’s South-eastern regions when Russia’s President 
Vladimir Putin realised that a relatively peaceful scenario was not to be repeated in the Donbas. This scenario 
was even less likely in the cities of Kharkiv and Odessa and the four areas that Russia began to refer to as ‘New 
Russia’, namely Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Kherson and Mykolayiv (Kuzio 2015; Wilson 2014). Russia 
also allegedly changed track when it became evident that only a minority of Russian-speakers supported 
Ukraine’s ‘federalisation’, or backed the separation of regions with significant Russian-speaking populations 
(Alexseev 2015; Dubovyk 2015; Giuliano 2015; Hale, Kravets et al. 2015; Haran 2015; Kuzio 2015). Yet, few 
scholars have heeded the call by Stephen Hutchings and Joanna Szostek to regard Russia’s media narratives in 
particular as an analytical mirror of the goals, the shifting ideas and fears driving foreign policy in the Ukrainian 
crisis (2015, p. 184). Rigorously analysing the shifts in the media’s agenda-setting and framing would enable us 
to nuance our understanding of how the Russian regime’s tactics evolved and changed over time as it reacted to 
the rapidly escalating conflict. Based on the above discussion, we articulate our hypotheses as follows: 
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Framing 
H1: Russian state-controlled media’s framing of protest throughout the duration of the Euromadan will be 
significantly more likely to trend in the direction of the disorder framing as compared to coverage by non-state-
controlled news sources. 
H2: Russian state-controlled media will be significantly more likely to employ the disorder framing of protest in 
the wake of the annexation of Crimea as compared to earlier coverage of the Euromaidan protests. 
H3: Russian state-controlled media will be significantly less likely to employ the disorder framing of protest 
after the eruption of hostilities in the Donbas as compared to coverage of protests in the wake of the annexation 
of Crimea. 
 
Agenda setting 
H4: Russian state-controlled media will be significantly more likely to frame protest as disorder when 
advancing the agenda of Ukraine’s ‘federalisation’, ‘referenda’ on the status of regions with significant Russian-
speaking populations, ‘reform’ and ‘constitutional’ status of ethnically ‘Russian’ or ‘Russian-speaking’ 
populations.  
H5: Russian state-controlled media will be significantly more likely than non-state-controlled media sources to 
advance the agenda of Ukraine’s ‘federalisation’, ‘referenda’ on the status of regions with significant Russian-
speaking populations, ‘reform’ and ‘constitutional status’ of ethnically ‘Russian’ or ‘Russian-speaking’ 
populations.  
 In the following section, we outline the methodology that we have developed to study Russian state-
controlled media’s protest framing and agenda setting, and apply it to analyse media coverage of the 
Euromaidan protests. 
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Data, Method and Analysis 
Methodological strategy 
For our analysis, we harvested stories on the Ukrainian crisis from the Integrum media database for the period 1 
November 2013 to 31 December 2014. This period corresponds to the weeks just before the start of 
Euromaidan, and the end of the calendar year in which Russia annexed Crimea, the war in the Donbas erupted, 
Western sanctions on Russia were imposed, the MH17 flight tragedy occurred and the Minsk process to resolve 
the crisis commenced. Our analysis proceeds as follows. We begin by applying the framework developed by 
(Authors 2015) to analyse whether Russian state-controlled media tend to resort to protest framing whereby 
street protests are portrayed in terms of violence, chaos and disorder (the disorder frame); or, alternatively, in 
more positive terms, as a citizen right (the freedom to protest  frame). Because the Euromaidan rallies in Kiev 
provided a backdrop for Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, we seek to capture the nuances of evolving coverage 
of street protest in Russian state-controlled media. We are seeking in particular to identify significant or 
anomalous shifts towards the disorder narrative. Next, we compare coverage by Russia’s state-controlled media 
with coverage by Russia’s non-state-controlled news sources, as well as by Zerkalo nedeli (Mirror Weekly), 
Ukraine’s leading news source that is not controlled by the Ukrainian state or the Kremlin. The logic behind this 
strategy is straightforward. We aim to ensure that media coverage does not simply capture the violence that 
indeed accompanied the pro- and anti-Europeanisation and pro- and anti-regime protests in Kiev and other parts 
of Ukraine, but rather, represents attempts to dramatise the disturbances and breakdown of social order 
accompanying street rallies. Next, we proceed to analyse the agenda-setting aspects of media framing. 
Specifically, having identified anomalous swings in Russian state-controlled media’s coverage of protest in 
Ukraine, we generate a random sample of stories for qualitative analysis by the authors. In our reading of the 
news stories, we aim to ascertain what they tell us about proposed ways of resolving the crisis. We then seek to 
infer Russia’s foreign policy intent from over-time shifts in the media coverage of Ukrainian protests.    
Media sources 
For our analysis, we have selected both the Russian federal (national) newspapers and federal TV channels, 
which are all to a greater or lesser extent state-controlled, even though they might have different ownership and 
management structures (Akhterov 2011; Dobek-Ostrowska and Smaele 2010; McNair 2000). The newspapers 
included in our analysis are Rossiyskaya gazeta, Izvestiya and Komsomolskaya pravda. The newspaper 
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Rossiyskaya gazeta is a daily fully owned by the Russian government.2 It adheres to formal writing style, and 
features state laws, directives and official announcements, in addition to political commentary and news. 
Russia’s state agencies tend to have a subscription for daily issues of Rossiyskaya gazeta. Our second 
newspaper, Izvestiya is also a daily newspaper, with a large readership pool. First printed in 1917 as one of the 
main official Soviet newspapers, it had been privatised in the early 1990s (Jones 2002). It is now owned by the 
National Media Group Company,3 which also has a 25 percent stake in Channel 1.4 Izvestiya became known for 
aggressive pro-Kremlin news coverage in particular after the December 2011 anti-government street protests in 
Russia. Our third newspaper is the daily Komsomolskaya pravda, a tabloid-style source. It is owned by the ESN 
Groups that belong to Grigory Berezkin who made his money in oil business and currently sits on boards of a 
number of state corporations, such as the Russian Railroads.5 The newspaper in recent years has become 
associated with aggressively pro-Kremlin news coverage. When reporting on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it has 
featured strong nationalist and populist language. 
By many accounts, television has been a key source of information for many Russians, particularly as 
print newspaper circulation dwindled in the 1990s (Akhterov 2011; Cottiero, Kucharski et al. 2015; Enikolopov, 
Petrova et al. 2011; McNair 2000; Mickiewicz 2008; Nelson, Orttung et al. 2015; Oates 2006; Smaele 2010; 
Smyth and Oates 2015). For our analysis, we have selected three leading state TV channels: Russia 1, Channel 1 
and NTV. The state channel Russia 1 is fully government owned and forms part of the All-Russian State 
Television and Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) group.6 Channel 1 is regarded as Russia’s leading TV 
channel. The Russian state owns a majority 51 percent stake in the company, while the closed joint stock 
company National Media Group owns 25 percent,7 and the Kremlin-friendly oligarch Roman Abramovich owns 
                                                 
2 ‘O gazete’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, available at: https://rg.ru/about/, accessed 8 July 2016. 
3 ‘Sostav holding’, NMG, available at: http://nm-g.ru/#sostav-holdinga, accessed 8 July 2016. 
4 ‘Osnovnye etapy razvitiya gazety Izvestiya’, RIA Novosti, 13 February 2012, available at: 
http://ria.ru/spravka/20120313/592628788.html, accessed 8 July 2016. 
5 ‘Grigory Berezkin’, Forbes, 21 March 2013, available at: http://www.forbes.ru/profile/grigorii-berezkin, 
accessed 8 July 2016; ‘Sovet direktorov’, Rossiiskie Zheleznye Dorogi, available at: 
http://rzd.ru/ent/public/ru?STRUCTURE_ID=5185&layer_id=5554&id=1209, accessed 8 July 2016. 
6 ‘O kompanii’, VGTRK, available at: http://vgtrk.com/#page/221, accessed 8 July, 2016. 
7 ‘Sostav holding’, NMG available at: http://nm-g.ru/#sostav-holdinga, accessed 8 July 2016. 
12 
 
a 24 percent stake.8 The channel NTV is owned by Gazprom Media and is widely regarded as a Kremlin-
controlled outlet.9 
 To ascertain whether there are differences in the editorial line between print and online versions of the 
sources analysed, we consulted the editorial staff of Izvestiya and Komsomolskaya Pravda.10 We were told that 
online news articles are produced by the same teams of journalists working on print issues. Content featuring in 
the print editions represents a subset of the online editions. Journalists from the Russia channel’s news 
programme Vesti whom we contacted indicated that online news include posts harvested from external 
sources. 11 We expect that the editorial policy of these sources is to selectively exclude stories on sensitive 
topics. We were not able to contact the editorial staff of the TV channels, but we assume that the above policy 
also holds true for those outlets. 
 Despite the existence of a diverse and complex media market in Ukraine, leading Russian news sources 
have enjoyed wide readership and viewership, particularly among Ukraine’s Russian-speaking populations. 
Serhiy Leshchenko (2014) writes:  
 
Media outlets based inside Russia continue to wield significant influence within Ukraine. The lack of 
a robust Ukrainian print-media tradition and the weak advertising market have left a gap that Russian 
newspapers have filled by churning out their own Ukrainian editions. These publications typically 
reprint articles directly from their Russian counterparts including Komsomolskaya Pravda, Izvestia, 
Moskovsky Komsomolets, Trud, and other outlets with origins in the Soviet era.  
Furthermore, he writes, 
equally if not more influential—especially in eastern and southern Ukraine—is Russian television. In 
the south, 47 percent of residents report watching Russian news programs. In the east, the figure is 44 
percent. Such levels of exposure to Russian propaganda help to explain the public mood and the 
                                                 
8 ‘Kto vladeet SMI v Rossii: vedushchie holdingi’, BBC Russian Service, 11 July 2014, available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2014/07/140711_russia_media_holdings, accessed 8 July 2016. 
9 ‘O kompanii’, Gazprom Media, available at: http://www.gpm.ru/ru/about/index, accessed 8 July 2016. 
10 Interview with deputy editor of Izvestia and observer at Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 2015. 
11 Interview with Vesti journalist, October 2015. 
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outbursts of separatism that have accompanied (and served as a pretext for) Russia’s recent military 
intervention (Leshchenko 2014).  
 
Echoing Leshchenko, Potyatynyk and Potyatynyk have highlighted that some 60% of print newspapers in 
Ukraine is in the Russian language; the figure is as high as 80% for magazines. ‘A cursory look at newsstands—
even in Lviv, the epicenter of the pro-Ukrainian and pro-European Sentiment—will confirm this figure’, they 
write (2014). Russian-language prime-time television had been likewise dominant in Ukraine’s media 
landscape. A survey conducted in October 2012 revealed that 44% of Ukraine’s TV broadcasting was in Russian 
language (Potyatynyk and Potyatynyk 2014). 
To analyse how Russian state-controlled media’s coverage of the crisis differed from coverage by 
sources outside of Kremlin control, we generated stories on protest from three additional Russian and Ukrainian 
online sources: Rosbalt, Interfax and Zerkalo nedeli. Rosbalt, with headquarters in Moscow and St. Petersburg, 
is one of the most widely-cited and read online source of news and analysis in Russia. The editor of Rosbalt, 
Natalya Cherkasova, is married to Viktor Cherkasov, who occupied senior positions in the Government and 
Security services agencies under Putin. This however, has been regarded as providing the outlet with a certain 
degree of protection from harassment suffered by other media sources.12 In October 2013, Rosbalt was subject 
to legal action in the Moscow City Court, which ruled that the agency’s registration is to be made invalid based 
on allegations of ostensible use of ‘inappropriate language’.13 The decision to suspend the operations of Rosbalt 
was overturned by the Supreme Court on 19 March 2014 however and the Court decided in favour of reinstating 
the registration of Rosbalt.14 Interfax is a non-governmental media agency. It employs several hundred 
journalists and has a number of federal, regional and national branch agencies, including in Kiev. Zerkalo nedeli 
is widely respected among Ukrainian experts as Ukraine’s leading Russian-language media source. The 
                                                 
12 Interview with Rosbalt journalist, December 2015. 
13 A Pussy Riot  video featuring swearing featured on the website. Tat’yana Vol’tskaya, ‘”Rosbalt” pochti 
zakryt’, Radio Svoboda, 31 October 2013. http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/25153954.html, accessed 6 
July 2016. 
14 https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%82, accessed 
6 July 2016. 
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newspaper also has Ukrainian- and English-language editions.15 It is generally considered to be a non-partisan 
source, albeit of a liberal-leaning orientation.16  
For those sources, we downloaded TV transcripts, newspaper articles and newswire reports from the 
Integrum Russian news database. We searched for stories on protest by employing the search term ‘protest*‘ 
(‘протест*‘). If online editions of news sources were available from the database, they were also downloaded, 
but stored separately from the print or broadcast editions. The total number of news stories harvested for the 
period 1 November 2013 to 31 December 2014 is 22,568. We present a breakdown of the figure in Table 1. 
Unfortunately, TV transcripts were not available for Channel 1 and for NTV during this period. We therefore 
used online editions of these news channels as the best available sources approximating the content featuring in 
the broadcast versions. News stories on the websites of these state-controlled channels are produced by the same 
staff, so we do not expect the tone of coverage to vary significantly between the online and broadcast sources. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Content analysis 
Considering the very large number of news stories on protest in the period of investigation, we rely on electronic 
content analysis.  
News filtering 
The stories downloaded from the database using a single search keyword are likely to include articles not related 
to street protests in Ukraine. We therefore introduced a geographical classifier developed by (Author 2015), 
which can accurately rank countries most strongly associated with particular news stories by automatically 
constructing a large dictionary of proper names associated with specific countries. The importance of 
geographical classification in news analysis of a large volume of stories is often overlooked. We consider this 
process important however because simple keyword matching tends to result in the retrieval of a large number 
of stories from contexts outside of the geographic area of investigation. For the purpose of dictionary 
construction, we also downloaded foreign news produced by the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS during the 
                                                 
15 E-mail communications with Russian and Ukrainian journalists, February 2016. 
16 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zerkalo_Nedeli, accessed 6 July 2016. 
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same period, and updated the dictionary each day using the stories for the best classification accuracy. Based on 
the results of geographical classification, we selected for our analysis stories ranked as having the first or second 
strongest order of association with Ukraine. 
 The geographical classifier effectively removes news stories about protests other than those occurring 
in Ukraine, but we found another source of noise in the data. The keyword ‘protest*’ employed in the database 
search may appear in different semantic contexts. For instance, our data contained stories about legislative or 
judicial battels. These stories are not related to street protest because ‘protest’ may refer to legal cases. An 
example would be when the prosecutor’s office lodges a ‘protest’ or when opposition deputies in a regional 
assembly lodge a formal ‘protest’ against particular laws or policies. One straightforward and commonly-used 
approach to eliminating irrelevant stories is to exclude those in which the keyword occurs only once. This 
procedure is highly selective however and risks eliminating short stories even if they may be about street 
protests. To capture the relevance of news stories that vary in length, we first measured the normalised 
frequency of approximately 1,000 protest-related words in each of the news stories. We also made sure that we 
selected stories with frequency greater than a certain threshold.17 As a result of the geographical classification 
and this filtering procedure, the number of news stories decreased to between 10% and 80% of the downloaded 
material (Table 2). 
[Table 2 about here] 
  
Computer-aided dictionary making 
Our corpus of several thousand full-text news items is of course too voluminous for in-depth qualitative analysis 
of each news story. Furthermore, it would be challenging for researchers to code documents spanning many 
months highly consistently. We therefore performed dictionary-based content analysis by employing a disorder-
freedom to protest dictionary and scale. In extracting the relevant words from news stories and in developing 
criteria for attaching scores to those words in our dictionary along the disorder-freedom to protest scale we 
relied on the Latent Semantic Scaling (LSS) dictionary construction technique and semantic analysis method 
developed by one of the authors of this paper (2015).  
                                                 
17 These words were selected based on frequencies of co-occurrences (‘collocation’) with the word ‘protest’. 
The threshold of 0.046 is the first quantile (25%) of frequencies of the words in a subset of news stories selected 
employing the conventional keyword matching approach (‘protest’ occurs more than once). 
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 LSS is essentially a new computer program that helps identify words frequently occurring in stories on 
a particular topic and to assign scores to those words. The word frequency search part of the technique aids in 
the dictionary construction process. The process of attaching scores to words in the dictionary is meant to 
capture the semantic nuances of the usage of words related to the particular topic—in the case of our analysis it 
is protest. In the existing Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) approaches developed by other scholars, scores are 
estimated either by statistically analysing word co-occurrence (collocation), or by estimating spatial proximities 
of words (Landauer and Dutnais 1997; Turney and Littman 2003). Our technique differs from the above two 
approaches in that it includes both collocation analysis and spatial analysis. The combination of the two 
different analytical techniques ensures that LSS dictionaries are robust against the inclusion of irrelevant words 
in news stories. It is also highly sensitive to subtle differences in news content. We also obtain higher reliability 
of parameters estimated by exploiting rich information in a large corpus of news stories. 
 For the present analysis, we adopted the protest framing dictionary from our previous research project 
on street protest in Russia. For that project, we downloaded a large corpus of Russian-language news stories on 
protest from the Integrum database of Russian news (containing 27 million words). Two native Russian 
speakers then content-analysed a sample of thirty news stories sentence by sentence and assigned scores to each 
sentence on a five-point disorder-freedom to protest scale. The first fifteen news stories were employed to aid 
the electronic dictionary construction (training set), and the remaining fifteen news stories were then used to 
validate the result of electronic content analysis employing the dictionary (test set). Figure 1 shows the scores 
assigned by the human coders and the computer in the training set (black) and test set (red). The framing scores 
on the disorder-freedom to protest scale using the dictionary range between -20 and +20. The level of agreement 
between human coding and machine coding in the test set, measured by Pearson’s correlation coefficient, was 
r=0.75. This result demonstrates the validity of dictionary coding of our large text data on protests. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
Framing analysis 
In order to identify news bursts of coverage of protests in Ukraine, we calculated average volumes of news 
stories on protest that appeared in Russia’s state-controlled media within seven-day periods. As illustrated in 
Figure 2, we observe spikes in the volume of news stories on 8 December 2013, on 23 January 2013, on 21 
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February 2014 and on 12 April 2014. We then treated the stories that appeared within twenty-eight-day 
windows of the spikes in protest news coverage (±fourteen days of the key dates) as belonging to the respective 
K1-K4 clusters. Applying the same procedure to non-state-controlled media, we checked if there is any surge in 
protests that had not been reported in Russia’s state-controlled media. We found broadly similar patterns in 
volumes of news reporting on protests. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 In Figure 3, red circles show framing scores of individual news articles published by state-controlled 
media on the disorder-freedom to protest scale, and the red curve represents smoothed values of the framing 
scores over the same time period. Framing of protests by non-state-controlled media is represented by a black 
line. Note that individual articles are not shown because that would make the graph over-crowded. In the graph, 
we observe that the framing of protest by state-controlled sources and non-state-controlled media tended to go 
parallel until mid-February 2014. After that, the framing of protest in Russia’s state-controlled media becomes 
more negative and remains significantly different from that of non-state-controlled media until August 2014.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 Figure 4 directly compares the means of framing scores of the four clusters with 95 percent confidence 
intervals. Note that lower values on the framing scores represent a tendency to portray protests as disorder, 
while higher values indicate a freedom to protest trend in framing. We observe that the framing of protest in 
Kremlin-controlled media had been relatively positive in K1 (5.31), but then the framing scores dropped by 2.35 
points in K2, then by a further 1.50 points in K3. After K3, the scores plunged further, by 5.63 points, reaching 
the lowest point in K4 (-4.18). By contrast, non-state-controlled media’s framing had not been as positive as that 
of the Kremlin-controlled media in K1 (2.97), but it showed a decrease in K2 by only 1.41 points. Furthermore, 
we even observe a slight increase in the protest framing scores in K2 and K3 (0.58 points). Non-state-controlled 
media’s framing also becomes more negative in K4, but only at the level of 3.06 points. These results partially 
confirm H1, which states that Russian state-controlled media’s framing of protest throughout the duration of the 
Euromadan will be significantly more likely to trend in the direction of the disorder framing as compared to 
coverage by non-state-controlled news sources. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
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 Next, we estimated differences in framing between sources using regression analysis.18 Although K4 
had been the most negative cluster in Figure 5, the result of the regression analysis suggests that the Kremlin-
controlled media’s framing had been actually most negative in K3, as compared to the other time periods. 
Specifically, Russia 1 (-5.42, p<0.016), Channel 1’s online edition (-4.72, p=0.041) and Komsomolskaya pravda 
(-12.0, p=0.055) became significantly more negative in their coverage of protests than in K1. K4 does not 
feature the strongest disorder framing of protest by Russia’s state-controlled media because framing by Interfax 
also becomes negative in K4, reflecting the nature of the events on the ground. In K4, relative to Interfax, only 
Komsomolskaya pravda’s online edition becomes slightly more negative (-2.5, p=0.057) than the paper’s 
framing of protest in K1. These results corroborate H2, namely that Russian state-controlled media will be 
significantly more likely to employ the disorder framing of protest in the wake of the annexation of Crimea as 
compared to earlier coverage of the Euromaidan protests. The results also support H3, which states that 
Russian state-controlled media will be significantly less likely to employ the disorder framing of protest after the 
eruption of hostilities in the Donbas as compared to coverage of protests in the wake of the annexation of 
Crimea. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 Having presented the variations in protest framing for the different time periods and news sources, we 
now turn to exploring the agenda-setting dimension of Russian state media’s coverage of popular discontent in 
Ukraine. In our analysis of protest framing, we employed the LSS technique. To analyse the agenda-setting 
aspect of Russia’s media strategy in Ukraine we now rely on a more straightforward content analysis technique 
of searching key words in news corpora and analyzing variations in frequency of use in different time periods. 
Considering that we observe an anomalous dip in the state-controlled media’s protest framing scores in K3 in 
particular, we generate a random selection of stories that appeared in that time period. This is meant to help us 
identify themes that featured most prominently just when the Russian media resorted to especially negative 
coverage of discontent in Ukraine.  
 We find that many stories in the sample featured references to Ukraine’s federalization, to the 
constitutional status of disputed territories and to the status of ethnic Russians and Russian language speakers. 
The stories also contained references to violent disruption of pro-Russian protests or to violence on the Maidan 
                                                 
18 We employed a multi-level regression model, whereby news articles are grouped by day in order to control 
for daily variations in framing. 
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(captured by the framing dimension of our analysis).19 We therefore estimated how protests were framed in 
association with the use of keywords ‘federation’ (Федера*), ‘constitution’ (конституц*), ‘Russian’ (русск*)—
the stem of the word that conveys the ethnic, rather than nation-state meaning of Russian—, ‘reform’ (реформ*) 
and ‘referendum’ (референдум*). We created dummy variables for occurrences of those keywords in news 
articles by simple pattern matching. We then explored the nature of protest framing associated with those words 
using multivariate regression analysis. As shown in Table 3, all but one of those keywords are found to be 
strongly and significantly (p<0.05) associated with negative framing of protest in Russia’s state-controlled 
media. Although ‘referendum’ is associated with more positive protest framing, we find that in stories featuring 
‘federation’ or ‘Russian’ along with ‘referendum’, protest coverage likewise trends towards the disorder 
rhetoric. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 These results largely corroborate H4, which states that Russian state-controlled media will be 
significantly more likely to frame protest as disorder when advancing the agenda of Ukraine’s ‘federalisation’, 
‘referenda’ on the status of regions with significant Russian-speaking populations, ‘reform’ and ‘constitutional’ 
status of ethnically ‘Russian’ or ‘Russian-speaking’ populations.  
 From our sample of news items, we also obtained frequencies of news stories containing each of the 
keywords in clusters. In so doing, we sought to ascertain whether Russia’s state-controlled media used specific 
words more frequently than did the non-state-controlled media. The results presented in Figure 6 show that 
                                                 
19 See for instance http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/889136/, NTV, 6 April 2014, accessed 6 July 2016; 
http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/891356/, NTV, 7 April 2014, accessed 6 July 2016; 
http://www.1tv.ru/news/world/256225, TV1, 11 April 2014, accessed 6 July 2016; 
http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/903696/, NTV, 12 April 2014, accessed 6 July 2016; 
http://www.1tv.ru/news/world/256438, TV1, 15 April 2014, accessed 6 July 2016. An illustrative story contains 
a reference to ‘benderovite fascist junta’ in Kiev and potential for ‘Slavic and other peoples chocking on blood’, 
alongside demands for federalisation, Komsomol’skaya pravda, 16 April 2014, available at: 
http://www.kp.ru/online/news/1712717/, accessed 6 July 2016. Another story mentions ‘Holocaust’ against the 
people, alongside a reference to demands for federalisation, NTV, 14 April 2014, available at:  
http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/906256/, accessed 6 July 2016. 
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‘reform’ featured 1.59 times more frequently in stories published in Russia’s state-controlled media as compared 
to those in the non-state-controlled sources in K2. The words ‘Russian’, ‘referendum’ and ‘federation’, 
respectively, featured 7.25, 6.54 and 1.53 times more frequently in state-controlled media in K3. In K4, the 
words ‘federation’ (1.64 times), ‘Russian’ (2.02 times) and ‘referendum’ (2.11 times) appeared more frequently 
in state-controlled media than in the non-state-controlled sources. All of those differences were found to be 
statistically significant (p<0.01) in Chi-square tests. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 We also investigated keyword use until the end of 2014 and compared it with keyword occurrences in 
non-state-controlled sources. We found that the Kremlin-controlled media frequently used the above-listed 
keywords only between February and June 2014 (Figure 7). After this period, the differences in frequency of 
usage between the state-controlled and non-state-controlled sources are not very pronounced. 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
 These results corroborate H5 for the period February-June 2014, namely that Russian state-controlled 
media will be significantly more likely than non-state-controlled media sources to advance the agenda of 
Ukraine’s ‘federalisation’, ‘referenda’ on the status of regions with significant Russian-speaking populations, 
‘reform’ and ‘constitutional status’ of ethnically ‘Russian’ or ‘Russian-speaking’ populations. 
 For ease of interpretation of how key developments surrounding the crisis might have influenced 
Russia’s media coverage, we created a timeline of key events between November 2013, when the Euromaidan 
protests erupted, and August 2014, by which time Russia annexed Crimea and had been involved in supporting 
the Donbas rebels (Figure 8). From the timeline, it is evident that Russia intensified its negative coverage of the 
Euromaidan significantly after the Russia-supported government fell and Yanukovych fled the country. Prior to 
that, Russian media’s framing of protests is not markedly different from that of non- state-controlled sources. 
Furthermore, there does not appear to be obvious correspondence between the numbers of casualties among 
Russian speakers as violence erupted, and negative coverage of the Euromaidan. In Odessa, on 2 May 2014, 
forty-eight protesters were killed. Hundreds of civilians, both Russian- and Ukrainian-speakers, died in the 
Donbas between April 2014 and the end of our observation period, December 2014. In fact, the military 
21 
 
hostilities involving the rebels and armed forces loyal to the new government in Kiev in the summer months 
resulted in significantly more casualties among Russian-speakers in the Donbas than in April, when we observe 
the most pronounced trend in the negative framing of protest combined with media narratives about 
federalisation and the status of Russian speakers.  
 Additional author-gathered data on protests occurring throughout Ukraine between February and 
September 2014 and featuring slogans that either challenged or, alternatively, supported Russia’s involvement in 
the crisis, indicate that protests in the latter category peaked around February-March, only to subside by May. 
The protests data indicate that protests broadly supportive of the Euromaidan and challenging Russia’s 
intervention in Ukraine generally featured larger numbers of participants; many occurred in the south-eastern 
regions (Figures 9-11). These data indicate that sustained protest activism by Russian speakers in favour of 
separatism was not widespread in territories outside of the Crimea. To further make sense of Russia’s media 
coverage of protests, we now turn to discussing the debates on Russian foreign policy objectives in Ukraine.  
[Figure 8 about here] 
[Figure 9 about here] 
[Figure 10 about here] 
[Figure 11 about here] 
 
Russia’s Objectives in Ukraine 
To what extent does our analysis help adjudicate between key strands of the wider debates on the drivers of 
Russia’s foreign policy in Ukraine, going beyond the more specific issue of media manipulation? One area of 
debate concerns the extent to which Russia’s policy has been driven by a normative impulse to protect Russian-
speakers (Tsygankov 2015). A related set of questions is whether the separatist impulse in the Crimea and 
Donbas has been largely home-grown (Giuliano 2015; Kudelia 2014), with Russia reacting to the grassroots 
appeals of Russian-speakers as part of its normative, value-driven, agenda (Tsygankov 2015), or, alternatively, 
whether these appeals had been part of an externally- (Russia-) driven strategic calculations that in fact involved 
engineering these sentiments and demands in the first place. Finally, scholars have highlighted that 
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disagreement among Russia’s leaders (Bacon 2015; Dugin 2014; Horvath 2015)20 and failure to reign in the 
motley factions of pro-separatism fighters in the Donbas (Shevel 2014) have arguably also shaped Russia’s 
tactics in the course of the early, pivotal months of the conflict in Ukraine.  
 Andrei Tsygankov’s (2014) concept of ‘honour’ in international relations provides an apt 
characterisation of his argument about Russia’s imperative to come to the aid of Ukraine’s Russian-speakers. It 
is important to note that Tsygankov accepts that a combination of factors motivated Russia’s policy in Ukraine 
in the wake of the Euromaidan. These factors include security concerns about EU’s and NATO’s eastward 
expansion and concerns about protecting the benefits of economic interdependence among post-Soviet states 
(see also Sakwa 2015). But, he also highlights the ideological, moral and nationalism imperatives like shared 
‘Slavic culture’ and ‘protecting Russia’s old historical and cultural ties with its neighbour’ as significant—and 
genuine—drivers of these policies, alongside material and security interests (Tsygankov 2015). Thus, 
Tsygankov (2015, pp. 287, 288) writes: 
 
Russian values include an authentic concept of spiritual freedom inspired by Eastern Christianity 
and the idea of a strong, socially protective state capable of defending its own subjects from 
abuses at home and threats from abroad. . . . Russians consider Ukrainian people to be ‘brotherly’ 
and are resentful of what they view as the Western nations’ attempts to challenge the established 
cultural bond or to convert Ukraine into their own system of values.  
 
 Relatedly, in what would support the conjecture that Russia had been reacting to the pleas of Ukraine’s 
Russian-speaking populations, a number of scholars, whether they share the argument about the nationalist and 
normative concerns driving Russian policy in Ukraine or not, have emphasized genuine popular support for 
federalisation or outright separatism, and for calls for the protection of the rights of Russian speakers. Some 
scholars have for instance argued that Russian-speaking populations felt betrayed by the corrupt national elite 
and its cronies in the disintegrating political structures in Ukraine’s regions (Sakwa 2015). Elise Giuliano (2015) 
                                                 
20 For a flavour of the sentiment among Russian far-right nationalist groups about the regime’s ambivalence and 
intra-regime divisions with regard to the annexation of Donbas, see ‘Aleksandr Dugin: Putin, ochnis’!’ Biznes 
Onlain: Delovaya  elektronnaya gazeta Tatarstana, 23 August 2014, available at 
http://123ru.net/moscow/6165909/, accessed 6 July 2016.. 
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reminds us that an emphasis on Russia’s role in the crisis tends to obscure the fact that a significant minority of 
populations in the Donbas shared the demands of the separatists. Serhiy Kudelia (2014) views the Donbas 
insurrection as ‘primarily a home-grown phenomenon’. He writes: ‘political factors—state fragmentation, 
violent regime change, and the government’s low coercive capacity—combined with popular emotions specific 
to the region—resentment and fear—played a crucial role in launching the armed secessionist movement there’ 
(emphasis original).  
 Others however have begged to disagree with the notions that ‘honour’, nationalism or normative 
imperatives drove Russian foreign policy following Ukraine’s Euromaidan protests and the resignation of 
Yanukovych, or that popular sentiments of Russian-speakers somehow made separatist sentiment imminent 
(Laruelle 2015b; Teper 2015). As Paul Chaisty and Stephen Whitefield (2015) note, political calculations, not 
‘principled ideological nationalism’ was the key imperative behind Putin’s tactics in the Crimea and Donbas. As 
other scholars have also argued, Putin has always been a reluctant nationalist, keeping the ultra-conservative and 
radical national ‘neo-slavophile’ and ‘neo-Eurasianist’ (Teper 2015) ideologues like Alexander Dugin—who 
popularized the term Russian Spring21 to refer to pro-Russian nationalist mobilization in Ukraine—and 
Aleksandr Prokhanov, at bay. The latter-day acceptance of these controversial thinkers into the political 
mainstream arguably followed the regime’s realization of the unlikely alliance between nationalists and political 
liberals during the 2011-2012 mass electoral protests against the Putin regime (Laruelle 2015b; Makarychev and 
Yatsyk 2014; Popescu 2012).  
 Accordingly, those who have highlighted the value imperatives of Russia’s foreign policy as a primary 
motivating factor have been leaning more towards interpreting Russia’s intervention in Ukraine as a response to 
sentiments and demands of Russian speakers. By contrast, proponents of the strategic interests argument have 
underlined how Russia initiated the secessionist impulse in Ukraine in the first place. They have also argued that 
the Putin regime manipulated nationalist sentiment and used the ‘thinkers’ associated with its radical expression 
to garner support for irredentism in Ukraine. It then proceeded to distance himself from radical nationalist 
agenda when it became evident that adhering to this agenda would involve substantial economic and military 
costs (Laruelle 2015a,b). Staying put with an irredentist agenda in the face of evidence that Putin’s meddling 
was unwelcome would of course present significant public relations—and military and other collateral—costs to 
                                                 
21 Aleksandr Dugin, ‘Russkaya vesna i ee prodolzhenie’, Izborskii klub, 4 March 2014, available at: 
http://www.izborsk-club.ru/content/articles/2912/, accessed 15 March 2016. 
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a regime seeking to portray itself as the protector of the rights of Russia’s brethren in the wider Russkiy mir 
(Russian World).22  
 The argument that Putin’s actions in Ukraine largely reflected his geopolitical tactical and strategic 
calculations is also supported from the quarters of the ultra-nationalist ideologues themselves. Some of these 
individuals in the wake of Crimea’s annexation rallied around Putin only to feel betrayed as the events on the 
ground unfolded.23 Alexander Dugin highlighted the deep divisions within the Russian policy establishment that 
emerged after it became evident that a Crimea-style, ‘peaceful’ scenario was not to materialize elsewhere in 
Ukraine. Indeed, by late April 2014 Putin arguably favoured at least partial disengagement from Donetsk and 
Luhansk. ‘Disengagement’ would be a misrepresentation of the depth of Russia’s involvement in Donsetsk and 
Luhansk after Crimea’s annexation considering evidence of Russian manpower and military hardware deployed 
in the conflict (Miller, Vaux et al. 2015; see also Minasyan 2015). Yet, as Yuri Teper (2015) wrote—and in 
what would support Dugin’s assertion of an ‘April shift’ in Putin’s strategy—, it was precisely in late April-May 
2014 that Putin began to backtrack on specific demands advanced by the Russian government after Crimea’s 
annexation. These earlier demands had been suggestive of an intention to replicate the Crimea scenario in 
Ukraine’s other predominantly Russian-speaking eastern and south-eastern regions. 
                                                 
22 A concept popularised by nationalist publicists like Alexandr Dugin to refer to territories in the former USSR 
with large Russian speaking populations notably Belarus, Eastern Ukraine, Crimea and Northern Kazakhstan. It 
also appeared in the rhetoric of various politicians including Putin himself referring to a fluid and nebulous 
entity of those united by love of Russian language and culture. For a discussion, see Vladimir Abarinov and 
Galina Sidorova, ‘Russkii mir, bessmyslennyi i besposhchadnyi’, Radio Svoboda, 18 February 2015, available 
at: http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/26855650.html#page=1, accessed 2 July 2016. 
23 In his 18 March 2014 address after Crimea’s annexation, Putin repeatedly referred to the rights of ethnic 
Russians (russkie). Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603, accessed 6 July 2016. On April 
17, during another televised press-conference, Putin admitted to providing military backing for Crimea’s native 
‘self-defense forces’ (sily samooborony Kryma) in the form of the mysterious ‘green men’ (zelenye  
chelovechki). Putin also warned against ‘euphoria’ associated with Crimea and cautioned against expecting a 
similar scenario elsewhere in Ukraine. Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796, accessed 4 
March 2016.   
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 Our media analysis lends further credence to arguments that highlight how tactical considerations, and 
less so, the ‘honourable’ impulse to protect Russian-speakers abroad in the name of an overarching national 
idea, drove Putin’s policy during the pivotal months following the eruption of the Euromaidan protests. The 
Russian media amplified the rhetoric of chaos, violence and disorder threatening fellow Russian-speakers and 
projected legalistic jargon about federalisation, constitutional change and the rights of Russian speakers. It then 
toned down this rhetoric at the point when violence erupted in the Donbas. The fact that the Kremlin-guided 
press did not engage much in such rhetoric after April suggests that either Putin failed to concern himself with 
the pleas of Russian speakers about federalisation, constitutional change or human rights on the ground, or that 
he and his entourage engineered or grossly amplified these concerns in the first place. The latter interpretation is 
more plausible in light of both our media analysis and the discussion of the qualitative literature on the subject. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we performed content analysis of Russian state-controlled media’s coverage of the Euromaidan 
protests. Specifically, we analysed how Russian media framed protests and how framing changed over time as 
the political events unfolded and as Russia annexed Crimea and engaged in a proxy war in the Donbas. We also 
explored the agenda-setting dimension of media coverage to ascertain how the media’s rhetoric on the status of 
ethnic Russians and on constitutional reform changed over time. Our framing analysis is based on the Latent 
Semantic Scaling (LSS) technique developed by one of the authors of the paper. The technique enabled us to 
construct a Russian-language dictionary that could be used to perform electronic content analysis of media 
coverage of protest along a disorder-freedom to protest scale. The framing and agenda-setting aspects of 
Russian state-controlled media’s coverage of the events in Ukraine were contrasted with those of Ukrainian and 
Russian media sources that are not controlled by the state. We find that Russian state-controlled media became 
significantly more likely than did the non-state controlled sources to adapt a disorder frame in coverage of 
protests after Yanukovych fled the country and in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The media also 
intensified rhetoric on the status of ethnic Russians and federalization. Both the framing and agenda-setting 
aspects of the coverage of protests by Russian state-controlled media however roughly fell in line with coverage 
by sources outside of the Kremlin control following the eruption of violence in the Donbas.  
 We are fully aware that our analysis of shifts in media framing of protest and in the usage of specific 
terms related to the status of ethnic Russians and territorial reform has its limitations when it comes to 
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uncovering the motivations behind the shifts in framing. Systematically analysing what led to the observed 
shifts in media coverage of protest would require an in-depth exploration of the ‘black box’ of the Kremlin’s 
decision making, which falls outside the scope of our paper. For instance, our analysis stops short of 
ascertaining the extent to which factional struggles among the Kremlin elites affected the observed shifts in 
policy. Nevertheless, our findings correspond to other studies cited in the paper, which, while not specifically 
analysing the media, have found similar tactical shifts in Russia’s foreign policy in Ukraine as the conflict 
unfolded. This in turn provides some confidence in the validity of our media analysis method. 
  Our paper helps nuance other systematic research specifically concerned with the role of Russia’s 
media in the furtherance of domestic and foreign policy. Thus, Stephen Hutchings and Vera Tolz (2015) have 
rightly cautioned against regarding the leading pro-Kremlin media personalities as mere puppets of the Kremlin. 
Puppets they may not be, but when it comes to policies of immense national significance, the narratives of 
media producers suspiciously follow the ebbs and flows of the Kremlin’s shifting tactics in Ukraine.  
Our analysis also contributes to the wider comparative theorizing into the media as a tool in the 
domestic and foreign policies of authoritarian states (Gehlbach and Sonin 2014; Jones-Rooy 2012; King, Pan et 
al. 2013; Morozov 2012; Stockmann and Gallagher 2011; Treisman and Guriev 2015). In the emerging literature 
on the use of the media to manipulate information on protest in autocracies, there is disagreement as to how 
rulers will exploit nationalist sentiment in particular to advance their domestic political and foreign policy 
objectives. Some scholars have suggested that authoritarian regimes may want to limit information that would 
fuel nationalist sentiment at home considering the potential implications for political instability (King, Pan et al. 
2013). Others have argued that authoritarian rulers may find some utility in fuelling nationalism at home if it 
helps them to rally citizens behind the regime (Dimitrov 2008; Hutchings and Tolz 2015; King, Pan et al. 2013; 
Morozov 2012; Weiss 2013). The specific techniques of manipulation of public opinion will of course vary 
depending on the peculiarities of national politics. In the Russian case, a number of scholars have noted that the 
state-controlled media began to systematically exploit Russian nationalist sentiment in the wake of the 
December 2011 protests (Chaisty and Whitefield 2015; Hutchings and Tolz 2015; Tolz and Harding 2015). 
These protests featured an unlikely alliance between liberal and nationalist forces in opposition to the Putin 
regime (Laruelle 2014; Popescu 2012; Umland 2011). That Russia resorted to nationalist rhetoric in its media 
coverage of the Euromaidan thus to a certain extent may represent an extension of the policy of rallying citizens 
around the regime under the Russian nationalist banner. What we find however is that the state-controlled media 
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quickly changed tactics as the events in Ukraine unfolded. As noted in the paper, these tactical shifts may have 
come in response to the collapse of the Yanukovych government, and then shifted again in response to western 
sanctions. They may have also changed when Russia realised that domestic appetite for the annexation of the 
Donbas territories in Ukraine is weak. The flow of refugees into Russia from the conflict zone may have also 
tempered domestic support for Russia’s irredentism in Ukraine. The shifts in media framing and nationalist 
rhetoric that we observe reflect the regime’s adaptability to rapidly changing political circumstances at home 
and abroad.   
Our Russian media analysis thus provides an additional building block in the generation of empirical 
knowledge about the sources of both authoritarian resilience (Nathan 2003) and authoritarian vulnerabilities (Pei 
2012), much of which is derived from studies of China. Similar to China, the capacity of Russia’s regime to 
effect tactical policy shifts given the information about past, ongoing and new popular challenges may well 
foster authoritarian resilience. Alternatively, we also show how the peculiarities of protest framing and of the 
media’s agenda setting could provide clues as to regime vulnerabilities otherwise obscured behind the mask of 
apparent invincibility to domestic and external public opinion. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Number of news stories downloaded 
 
Sources Newspaper TV Online Newswire 
State-controlled Izvestiya 366  - 813  - 
  
Komsomolskaya 
Pravda 455  - 2,864  - 
  Rossiyskaya gazeta 559  - 0  - 
  Channel 1  - 0 1,549  - 
  NTV  - 0 2,557  - 
  Russia 1  - 2,557  -  - 
Non-state-
controlled Zerkalo nedeli 322  - 2,265  - 
  Interfax  -  -  - 5,586 
  Rosbalt  -  -  - 2,675 
  Total 1,702 2,557 10,048 8,261 
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Table 2: Number of stories on protest in Ukraine 
  Sources Newspaper TV Online Newswire 
State-
controlled Izvestiya 64 (17.5%) -  198 (24.4%) -  
  
Komsomolskaya 
pravda 60 (13.2%) -  1,183 (41.3%) -  
  Rossiyskaya gazeta 98 (17.5%) -  -  -  
  Channel 1 -  -  641 (41.4%) -  
  NTV -  -  1,322 (51.7%) -  
  Russia 1 -  671 (26.2%) -  -  
Non-state-
controlled Zerkalo nedeli 43 (13.4%) -  1,301 (57.4%) -  
  Interfax -  -  -  2,162 (38.7%) 
  Rosbalt -  -  -  2,089 (78.1%) 
  Total 265 (15.6%) 671 (26.2%) 4,645 (46.2%) 4,251 (51.5%) 
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Table 3: Framing of protest associated with keywords 
 
Keyword Score 
Federation -6.41 
Constitution -2.61 
Russian -7.05 
Reform -2.34 
Referendum 3.05 
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Figure 1: Agreement between human and machine coding 
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Figure 2: Seven-day average volume of news stories on protest  
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Figure 3: Framing of protest by Russia’s state-controlled media 
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Figure 4: Framing of protest in clusters K1-4  
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Figure 5: Differences in protest framing between sources in clusters K1-K4  
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Figure 6: Frequency of keyword use 
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Figure 7: Frequency of use of keywords until the end of 2014  
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Figure 8: Timeline 
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Figure 9: Protest intensity 
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Figure 10. Regional protests supportive of Russia’s agenda in Ukraine 
 
 
Figure 11. Regional protests supportive of Euromaidan and challenging Russia’s intervention in Ukraine 
 
 
Note to protest data in figures 10 and 11: The data were compiled from Russian and Ukrainian media sources, 
including both Ukrainian- and Russian-language sources. They cover protests occurring across Ukraine in the 
period between February and September 2014. Our objective was to capture the regional dimension of 
mobilization and counter-mobilization in Ukraine during the period between Yanukovych’s flight from Kiev 
and the weeks following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and onset of separatist violence in the Donbas. This 
mapping exercise also allows us to get a sense of the broader pattern of mobilization in the country going 
beyond the Euromaidan, which has formed the focus of much of the scholarly analysis of protest dynamics 
during the crisis. Each protest report was cross-checked against other sources for accuracy. In compiling the 
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data, the following general definition of protests was employed. Protest refers to a gathering of people with the 
explicit aim of articulating particular demands publicly in a public space. Among the protest events recorded are 
several demonstrations organized together with football matches played in the cities (such as in Kharkov on 27 
April 2014). Such marches had been organized a day before the football match, with organisers encouraging 
people to join the protest event before or after the match. A number of protests have had a violent outcome, in 
that they involved clashes with other groups or the police, or have resulted in occupation of public buildings and 
death. We include the latter type of protests, but exclude those featuring armed groups whose main objective 
was to seize local authority buildings and other government offices and assume power in particular localities. 
The latter type of events would be reported in the Ukrainian media as ‘armed people in masks have seized . . . .’ 
These events mainly occurred beginning in April 2014 in the Donbas localities. 
 It is important to note that following the change of government in Kiev (Feb 19-23), some cities 
explicitly outlawed public gatherings, while other cities have imposed restrictions on public assembly or tended 
to turn down requests to hold protests from April onwards. These restrictions are likely to have led to a decrease 
in both the size and frequency of demonstrations. Furthermore, during this time, Ukraine’s new authorities 
authorised arrests of pro-Russian activists. Likewise, in the Crimea and Donbas activists challenging Russia’s 
intervention and occupation were also arrested. 
 Only the protests that could be cross-checked using at least two different sources were included. For 
the purposes of constructing the protest Figures, we used the most conservative estimates of number of 
participants recorded in the media. For instance, if a media protest story suggested a range of participants of 
7,000-10,000 people, we used the figure of 7,000. Likewise, if a story featured a reference to ‘several hundred’ 
participants, we used the most conservative figure of 200. In recording the protest data, we provide a link to 
media stories from which the data were derived. These data are available from the authors upon request.  
 
